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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
 
This appeal presents a question of first impr ession 
relating to the construction and enforceability of an 
exclusion in an automobile insurance contract stating that 
an insured cannot recover benefits under both the liability 
coverage and the underinsured motorist coverage of the 
insurance contract. The District Court exercised 
jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship under 28 
U.S.C. S 1332. We exercise appellate jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. S 1291. We hold that, on the facts of this case, the 
"dual recovery" prohibition is invalid and unenforceable 
pursuant to Pennsylvania's Motor Vehicle Financial 
Responsibility Law (MVFRL). 75 Pa. C.S.A. S 1701 et seq. 
 
I 
 
This case is a dispute about insurance coverage arising 
from the following facts. On July 16, 1995, Mrs. Cosenza 
was driving a vehicle in which her husband and mother 
(Ms. Dezii) were passengers when they collided with a 
vehicle driven by Angela Nicolucci. Mr. Cosenza and Dezii 
were very seriously injured in the crash and Mrs. Cosenza 
sustained some injuries as well. They instituted suit in 
state court against Nicolucci. Nicolucci joined Mrs. Cosenza 
as a defendant, claiming that she was contributorily 
negligent. Nationwide Insurance, the Cosenzas' insur er and 
the appellee in this case, assumed the defense of Mrs. 
Cosenza and consistently asserted her lack of fault. On the 
eve of trial, the suit was settled. 
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Under the terms of the settlement, appellants received 
$15,000 from Nicolucci's insurer, the full amount of 
coverage available under her liability policy. Mr . Cosenza 
and Dezii also received some payment under the liability 
portion of Nationwide's auto policy, but did not exhaust the 
full amount of the coverage available under that policy. The 
Cosenzas' vehicle was covered by an auto insurance policy 
issued by Nationwide Insurance. That policy pr ovided 
$500,000 in liability coverage and $500,000 in 
underinsured motorist coverage. Mr. Cosenza also 
maintained an umbrella insurance policy that pr ovided an 
additional $1,000,000 in total liability coverage and 
$500,000 in underinsured motorist coverage. The 
settlement did not include any payments by Nationwide 
under either the underinsured motorist portion of the policy 
or under the umbrella policy. 
 
Thereafter, the Cosenzas and Dezii, the appellants in this 
appeal, notified Nationwide of their intention to proceed 
with underinsured motorist arbitration under their auto 
insurance policy and the supplemental umbrella insurance 
policy. They filed a petition in state court to compel 
arbitration. In response, Nationwide filed a notice of 
removal of the proceedings to the district court and also 
filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment preventing 
arbitration. Each of the parties moved for summary 
judgment with the following results: 
 
       1) The District Court determined that the dispute did 
       not fall within the insurance contract's arbitration 
       clause and was, therefore, properly before the court; 
 
       2) Mr. Cosenza and Dezii, who recover ed under the 
       liability portion, were prohibited fr om recovering 
       underinsured motorist benefits for their own injuries 
       under the auto policy or the umbrella policy; 
 
       3) Mrs. Cosenza, who did not recover under the liability 
       coverage, was allowed to seek recovery under the 
       underinsured motorist provision of the auto policy and 
       the umbrella policy; 
 
       4) Mrs. Cosenza was prohibited from r ecovering loss of 
       consortium benefits for her husband's injuries under 
       the underinsured motorist provisions; 
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       5) Mr. Cosenza was allowed to seek loss of consortium 
       benefits for his wife's injuries under the underinsured 
       motorist provision; 
 
       6) The court determined that Nationwide was not 
       entitled to a credit in the amount of payments already 
       received by the insureds pursuant to the state court 
       settlement. 
 
Appellants appeal the District Court's ruling that this 
dispute is not subject to arbitration. Alter natively, they 
appeal the court's holding that Mr. Cosenza and Dezii are 
barred from recovering under the underinsured motorist 
provision of the auto policy and under the umbr ella policy. 
They also appeal the court's ruling that Mrs. Cosenza is 
barred from recovering loss of consortium damages based 
on her husband's injuries under the underinsur ed motorist 
provision of the auto policy and under the umbr ella policy. 
Nationwide purports to cross-appeal the district court's 
findings as to Mrs. Cosenza's eligibility for r ecovery, Mr. 
Cosenza's right to recover for loss of consortium for his 
wife's injuries, and the court's ruling that Nationwide is not 
entitled to a credit for payments made in the state court 
settlement. 
 
II 
 
Before proceeding to a discussion of the substantive 
issues in this case there are two thr eshold issues that must 
be addressed - whether the district court had jurisdiction to 
decide the issues raised in this case and whether this Court 
can properly entertain Nationwide's purported cross-appeal 
of the adverse portions of the District Court's judgment. As 
a federal court sitting in diversity, we are bound to 
adjudicate the case in accordance with applicable state law. 
See Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Both 
parties agree that Pennsylvania law gover ns this dispute. 
 
A. Jurisdiction/Arbitrability of Claims Raised 
 
To determine the arbitrability of a dispute a court must 
address two issues: 1) whether the parties for med an 
agreement to arbitrate; and 2) whether the dispute in 
question falls within the scope of that agreement. Messa v. 
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State Farm Ins. Co., 641 A.2d 1167, 1168 (Pa. Super. 
1994). In this case, both parties concede the existence of an 
agreement to arbitrate. Thus, the sole question is whether 
the dispute regarding appellants' entitlement to seek 
recovery under the underinsured motorist (UIM) provision 
of the contract falls within the scope of the arbitration 
agreement. 
 
Appellants argue that the District Court did not have 
jurisdiction to rule on the summary judgment motions that 
are the subject of this appeal because the insurance 
contracts require arbitration of their claim.1 The UIM 
provision of the Cosenza's insurance policy pr ovides: 
 
       RECOVERY 
 
       1. Before recovery, we and any party seeking 
       protection under this [UIM] coverage must agree on 
       two points: 
 
       a) whether there is a legal right to r ecover damages 
       from the owner or driver of an underinsur ed 
       motor vehicle; and if so, 
 
       b) the amount of such damages. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Nationwide argues that the appellants have not properly preserved 
this particular issue for appeal pursuant to F .R.A.P. 3(c)(1)(B), which 
requires an appellant's Notice of Appeal to "designate the judgment, 
order, or part thereof being appealed." Appellants' Notice of Appeal 
designated the District Court's November 2, 2000 Or der, which did not 
address the arbitration issue, instead of its October 27 Order, which did 
dispose of that issue. Appellants' failure to specifically designate the 
October 27 Order for appeal is not fatal because a policy of liberal 
construction of notices of appeal prevails in the Third Circuit where the 
intent to appeal an unmentioned or mislabeled ruling is apparent and 
there is no prejudice to the adverse party. Williams v. Guzzardi, 875 F.2d 
46, 49 (3d Cir. 1989)("if from the notice of appeal itself and the 
subsequent proceedings . . . it appears that the appeal was intended to 
have been taken from an unspecified . . . or der . . . , the notice may be 
construed as bringing up the unspecified or der for review."); Murray v. 
Commercial Union Insurance Co., 782 F .2d 432, 434-35 (3d Cir. 
1986)(exercising jurisdiction because despite the mislabeled Notice of 
Appeal, "in their appellate briefs all parties addressed every issue 
presented"). 
 
                                5 
  
       If agreement can't be reached, the matter will go to 
       arbitration. 
 
       2. Questions between the injured party and us 
       regarding whether the injured party is an insured 
       under this coverage, or the limits of such coverage, 
       are not subject to arbitration and shall be decided 
       by a Court of law. 
 
(Endorsement 2360, Underinsured Motorist Coverage -- 
Non-Stacked (Pennsylvania) App. 39a) (emphasis in 
original). Thus, according to the clear ter ms of the 
arbitration agreement, questions regar ding whether a 
claimant is an "insured" for the purposes of UIM coverage 
or questions regarding the limits of UIM coverage are to be 
decided by the courts. All other questions should be 
submitted for arbitration.2 
 
First, we consider if this case presents the question of 
whether the appellants are "insureds" for the purpose of 
UIM coverage. The insurance policy defines an"insured" as 
"one who is described as entitled to protection under each 
coverage." (App. 12a)(emphasis added). Accor dingly, we look 
to the section governing UIM coverage to deter mine whether 
the appellants are entitled to protection thereunder. That 
coverage endorsement provides that Nationwide will pay 
"compensatory damages, including derivative claims, which 
are due by law to you or a relative fr om the owner or driver 
of an underinsured motor vehicle because of bodily injury 
suffered by you or a relative." (UIM Endorsement 2360, 
App. 38a)(emphasis added). Thus, for the purposes of this 
UIM coverage, an "insured" is the policy holder and 
relatives of the policy holder who are entitled by law to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Appellants also reference an arbitration provision found in the UIM 
coverage section of the auto insurance contract stating that "if we and 
the insured disagree about the right to r ecover damages, or the amount 
of such damages . . ." arbitration will ensue. (App. 29a). However, this 
broader arbitration provision was "r eplaced" by Endorsement 2360 to the 
insurance policy, which states "[t]his endorsement replaces the policy's 
Underinsured Motorists coverage section. Coverage is subject to all terms 
and conditions of the policy, except as changed by this endorsement." 
(App. 38a). Accordingly, we look to the arbitration provision set out in 
Endorsement 2360 to determine the arbitrability of the instant dispute. 
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recover damages from the driver or owner of the 
underinsured vehicle. 
 
Nationwide argues that because appellants have 
recovered under the liability provisions and are prohibited 
by the policy language from also recovering under the UIM 
provisions that there are no damages"due by law" and 
thus, appellants do not fit within the definition of an 
"insured." This argument misappr ehends the definition of 
an "insured" set out in the UIM pr ovisions. The definition 
does not require that damages be due by law under the 
insurance contract, as Nationwide argues. Instead, the 
definition requires only that damages be due by law from 
the driver of an underinsured vehicle. Nowhere does 
Nationwide suggest that the appellants are not entitled 
under the law to recover additional damages fr om Nicolucci, 
the driver of the underinsured vehicle. Even if Nationwide 
did advance such an argument, the issue of whether 
appellants are legally entitled to damages fr om Nicolucci is 
an issue that falls squarely within the agr eement to 
arbitrate, as set forth above. Further, Nationwide's 
argument begs the question of who is an "insured" because 
it argues that the appellants are not"insureds" because 
Nationwide is correct about the underlying dispute 
regarding whether or not the dual r ecovery prohibition is 
enforceable. The question of whether that pr ovision is 
enforceable, however, is a separate and distinct question 
from whether the appellants are "insur eds" under the UIM 
coverage. 
 
The fallacy of Nationwide's argument is also 
demonstrated by the "limits of payment" pr ovision of the 
contract, which Nationwide references in support of its 
argument. That provision states, "[t]he insured may recover 
for bodily injury under the auto liability coverage or the 
underinsured motorist coverage of this policy, but not 
under both coverages." (UIM Endorsement 2360, App. 40a) 
(emphasis added). This provision forms the basis of 
Nationwide's argument that there ar e no damages "due by 
law" and that, therefore, appellants ar e not insureds. 
However, this same provision effectively states that 
appellants are considered "insur eds" within the meaning of 
the UIM coverage. Thus, the underlying dispute in this case 
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cannot be characterized as a dispute regar ding whether the 
injured party is an insured and cannot escape arbitration 
on that basis. 
 
We must also consider whether this case pr esents a 
question regarding the limits of UIM coverage. We conclude 
that the dispute does not fall within the arbitration 
agreement because it is clearly within the second prong of 
the arbitration agreement as a dispute about the "limits" of 
the coverage. The UIM Endorsement contains the following 
provision: 
 
       LIMITS OF PAYMENT 
 
       Amounts Payable for Underinsured Motorists Losses 
 
       We agree to pay up to the limits stated in the policy 
       Declarations. The following applies to these limits: 
 
       *** 
 
       4. The insured may recover for bodily injury under the 
       Auto Liability coverage or the Underinsured Motorists 
       coverage of this policy, but not under both coverages. 
 
(UIM Endorsement 2360, App. 40a). According to the 
express terms of the UIM endorsement, the underlying 
dispute is a question between the injured parties and 
Nationwide regarding the limits of coverage and must, by 
the very terms of the insurance agreements, be decided by 
a court of law. 
 
Appellants argue that, in light of the important state law 
public policy favoring arbitration of automobile insurance 
disputes, this dispute must be dismissed by the court and 
submitted to arbitration. Indeed, Pennsylvania public policy 
does favor arbitration of insurance claims. Bor gia v. 
Prudential Insurance Co., 758 A.2d 843, 847-50 (Pa. 2000); 
Brennan v. General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corp., 
574 A.2d 580 (Pa. Super. 1980). However , state courts have 
not favored arbitration when to do so would contravene the 
express terms of a binding arbitration agreement. Brennan, 
574 A.2d 580 (dismissing dispute as arbitrable, but 
disclaiming that it would have done so had ther e been any 
limiting language in the arbitration clause); Messa v. State 
Farm Ins. Co., 641 A.2d 1167, 1168 (Pa. Super. 1994) 
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(scope of arbitrator's authority is limited by ter ms of 
arbitration agreement). Therefore, despite Pennsylvania's 
preference for arbitration of auto insurance disputes, the 
District Court properly concluded that the dispute in this 
case is specifically excluded from the arbitration agreement 
and appropriately maintained jurisdiction over the claim. 
 
B. Nationwide's Purported Cross-Appeal 
 
In its brief Appellee Nationwide asks this Court to reverse 
the District Court on every issue where its conclusions were 
adverse to the insurance company. Specifically Nationwide 
argues the District Court erred in holding that Mrs. 
Cosenza is not excluded from seeking recovery under the 
UIM provision for her injuries, that Mr . Cosenza is not 
precluded from seeking recovery under the UIM provision 
for loss of consortium due to Mrs. Cosenza's injuries, and 
that Nationwide is not entitled to a credit for its 
contribution to the tort settlement. However , Nationwide 
failed to follow the procedures for lodging a cross-appeal on 
any of these issues. It is settled law that "what (an appellee) 
may not do in the absence of a cross-appeal is to `attack 
the decree with a view either to enlarging his own rights 
thereunder or of lessening the rights of his adversary, 
whether what he seeks is to correct an err or or to 
supplement the decree with respect to a matter not dealt 
with below.' " Morley Constr. Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 
300 U.S. 185, 191, 57 S.Ct. 325 (1937)(quoting United 
States v. American Ry. Express Co., 265 U.S. 425, 435, 44 
S.Ct. 560 (1924)). Because a reversal on any of the three 
adverse holdings would enlarge Nationwide's rights and 
lessen Appellants' rights, Nationwide was required to file a 
cross-appeal. 
 
Nationwide responds that its failure to cr oss-appeal is 
immaterial because this Court may affirm the District 
Court on any basis which finds support in the r ecord 
and/or that as long as the issue raised is mer ely an 
alternative argument relative to the judgment below, a 
cross-appeal on that issue is unnecessary. While these are 
accurate statements of law, they are inapplicable here 
because Nationwide is asking us to reverse the District 
Court, not to affirm on the basis of r ecord evidence. 
Additionally, Nationwide does not present any"alternative 
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arguments relative to the judgment below." On the 
contrary, it plainly asks us to reverse the District Court's 
holdings and constrict the appellants' rights, which we 
cannot do in the absence of a properly filed cross-appeal. 
Because Nationwide failed to file a cross-appeal, none of the 
three issues on which the District Court ruled adversely to 
Nationwide are properly before us on appeal. 
 
III 
 
Due to Nationwide's failure to file a cr oss-appeal, the only 
remaining substantive issues revolve ar ound the effect of 
the insurance policy's "dual recovery" pr ohibition. A 
determination as to the proper construction and the validity 
of the dual recovery prohibition disposes of the three 
remaining substantive issues in this case. First, the District 
Court concluded that the contractual prohibition on 
recovering under both the liability coverage and the UIM 
coverage, precluded Mr. Cosenza and Ms. Dezii from 
seeking recovery for their own injuries under the UIM 
coverage and precluded Mrs. Cosenza from seeking recovery 
for loss of consortium based on her husband's injuries 
under the UIM coverage. 
 
Second, Mr. Cosenza also maintained an umbr ella 
insurance policy designed to protect against losses in 
excess of the amount covered by his other liability 
insurance policies, which provided an additional 
$1,000,000 in liability coverage and $500,000 in UIM 
coverage. The umbrella policy here included the limitation 
that "[i]t is agreed that this endorsement is subject to the 
terms and conditions of the underinsur ed motorist coverage 
included in [the auto policy] . . ." (App. 49a). Accordingly, 
when the District Court concluded that no recovery was 
available under the UIM coverage of the auto policy for any 
injuries suffered by Mr. Cosenza or Dezii, it also had to 
conclude that they could not seek recovery under the 
umbrella policy. However, the converse is true as well. That 
is, if the dual recovery prohibition is unenforceable or 
interpreted narrowly as allowing UIM coverage for the 
appellants, they would be entitled to coverage under the 
umbrella policy as well. 
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Third, the district court concluded that Mrs. Cosenza's 
loss of consortium claim is ultimately based on bodily 
injuries suffered by Mr. Cosenza and is therefore derivative 
of his claim. Setting aside the dual recovery issue, under 
Pennsylvania law the success of a derivative claim is 
"always dependent upon the injured spouse's right to 
recover." Scattaragia v. Shin Shen Wu, 495 A.2d 552, 554 
(Pa. Super. 1985). Thus, the District Court concluded that 
because Mr. Cosenza, as the injured spouse, had no right 
to recover under the UIM coverage or the umbr ella policy, 
Mrs. Cosenza could have no right to recover derivatively 
under those same insurance contracts. Again, however , 
because this conclusion is based on the assumption that 
Mr. Cosenza had no right of recovery under the UIM 
coverage or the umbrella policy, a reversal on that issue 
necessitates a reversal on Mrs. Cosenza's derivative loss of 
consortium claim.3 Thus, a r esolution of the dual recovery 
issue effectively resolves all of the substantive issues in this 
case. 
 
A. The Express Terms of the UIM Insurance Coverage 
 
Endorsement 2360 to Appellants' UIM insurance 
contract, which "replaces the policy's Underinsured 
Motorists coverage section," provides that"[t]he insured 
may recover for bodily injury under the Auto Liability 
coverage or the Underinsured Motorists coverage of this 
policy, but not under both coverages." (App. 38a & 40a) 
(emphasis added). Nationwide argues that this language 
clearly and unambiguously precludes Mr. Cosenza and 
Dezii, who have already received some payment under the 
liability coverage, from also recovering under the UIM 
coverage. Nationwide also argues that this dual recovery 
prohibition precludes Mrs. Cosenza fr om recovering 
derivatively under the UIM coverage for loss of consortium 
based on her husband's bodily injuries, because he 
recovered some damages under the liability coverage. 
 
When interpreting the terms of an insurance contract the 
court must generally attempt to effectuate the intent of the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. It is undisputed that the UIM coverage includes coverage for derivative 
claims, such as a loss of consortium claim, based on bodily injuries 
suffered by Mr. Cosenza. 
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parties as manifested by the language of the written 
instrument. Standard Venetian Blind Co. v. American 
Empire Ins. Co., 469 A.2d 563, 566 (Pa. 1983); Mohn v. 
American Cas. Co. of Reading, 326 A.2d 346, 451 (Pa. 
1974). To that end, courts must generally enforce the clear, 
unambiguous terms of the policy. See, e.g., The Medical 
Protective Co. v. Watkins, 198 F .3d 100 (3d Cir. 1999); 
Madison Construction Co. v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., 735 
A.2d 100 (Pa. 1999). Nationwide argues that the terms of 
UIM coverage prohibiting dual recovery ar e clear and 
unambiguous and must therefore be enfor ced by this court. 
 
The burden is on the insured to establish coverage under 
an insurance policy. Erie Ins. Exchange v. T ransamerica 
Ins. Co., 533 A.2d 1363, 1366-67 (Pa. 1987). As we 
concluded in the discussion on arbitrability above, 
appellants are clearly insureds under both the auto 
insurance policy and the umbrella policy. It is the insurer, 
however, that bears the burden of establishing the 
applicability of an exclusion in an insurance contract, 
American States Ins. Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 628 A.2d 
880, 887 (Pa. Super. 1993), and exclusions ar e always 
strictly construed against the insurer and in favor of the 
insured. Selko v. Home Ins. Co., 139 F .3d 146, 152 n. 3 (3d 
Cir. 1983). 
 
B. Invalidating Clear and Unambiguous Exclusions in 
Insurance Contracts 
 
Instead of arguing that the dual recovery provision is 
ambiguous, appellants' main avenue of attack is to argue 
that the provision is unenforceable as violative of public 
policy as evidenced by case law and the intent of the 
Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law 
(MVFRL), 75 Pa. C.S.A. S 1701, et seq. Nationwide takes the 
exactly contrary position and argues that not only is 
enforcement of the dual recovery pr ohibition consistent 
with public policy, dual recovery is never  allowed under 
Pennsylvania law regardless of whether the insurance 
contract at issue expressly prohibits it. 
 
Pennsylvania courts have consistently held that"even 
clear and unambiguous insurance policy language may 
conflict with an applicable statute, [including] . . . the 
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MVFRL." Kmonk-Sullivan v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 746 
A.2d 1118, 1121 (Pa. Super. 1999). See also Allwein v. 
Donegal Mut. Ins. Co., 671 A.2d 744, 752 (Pa. Super. 1996) 
(en banc). While courts do not have a license to r ewrite 
insurance contracts, insurers do not have a right to rewrite 
or undercut state legislation or policy. Allwein, 671 A.2d at 
752; Kmonk-Sullivan, 746 A.2d at 1121. In such situations, 
courts will not give effect to the contract pr ovision: 
 
       As a general rule, stipulations in a contract of 
       insurance in conflict with, or repugnant to, statutory 
       provisions which are applicable to, and consequently 
       form a part of, the contract, must yield to the statute, 
       and are invalid, since contracts cannot change existing 
       statutory laws. 
 
Id. See also George J. Couch, Couch on Insurance 2d (Rev. 
ed.) S 13.7 at 827 (1984). Accordingly, if the dual recovery 
prohibition contained in appellants' UIM coverage conflicts 
with the MVFRL or the public policy inherent therein, this 
Court must declare it invalid and unenfor ceable. 
 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has provided the 
following guidelines to assist in determining when an 
insurance contract provision is against public policy: 
 
       Public policy is to be ascertained by refer ence to the 
       laws and legal precedents and not from general 
       considerations of supposed public interest. It is only 
       when a given policy is so obviously for or against the 
       public health, safety, morals or welfare that there is a 
       virtual unanimity of opinion in regard to it, that a 
       court may constitute itself the voice of the community 
       in declaring what is or is not in accord with public 
       policy. The phrase "public policy" has been used also 
       when the courts have interpreted statutes br oadly to 
       help manifest their legislative intent. 
 
Paylor v. Hartford Ins. Co., 640 A.2d 1234, 1235 
(1994)(emphasis added) (citations omitted). Other state 
courts have further elaborated that "in deciding whether to 
uphold an insurance policy exclusion, which operates to 
deny coverage to an injured party, [our focus] is the factual 
circumstances of the particular case." Kmonk-Sullivan, 746 
A.2d at 1123. See also Paylor v. Hartfor d Ins. Co., 640 A.2d 
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1234, 1240 (Pa. 1994). Moreover, "[c]ontract provisions 
[that] are not in accord with public policy, and are not 
advantageous to the insured are particularly subject to a 
finding of invalidity." Kmonk-Sullivan, 746 A.2d at 1123. 
See also Allwein, 671 A.2d at 753 (quoting Geor ge J. 
Couch, Couch on Insurance S 13.7, at 827-29 (2d ed. rev. 
1984)). There is also a presumption that"the Legislature 
intends to favor the public interest as opposed to any 
private interest." Pennsylvania Fin. Responsibility Assigned 
Claims Plan v. English, 664 A.2d 84, 87 (Pa. 1995)(citations 
omitted). See also Allwein, 671 A.2d at 751; Kmonk- 
Sullivan, 746 A.2d at 1123; 1 Pa. C.S. S 1922. These 
guidelines are read to favor coverage for the insured in 
close or doubtful cases. Kmonk-Sullivan, 746 A.2d at 1123; 
Allwein, 671 A.2d at 751. 
 
This Court has also had occasion to consider limits on 
the enforceability of clear and unambiguous pr ovisions in 
insurance contracts under Pennsylvania law. In Bensalem 
Twp. v. International Surplus Lines Ins. Co. , after a review 
of Pennsylvania law, we concluded that under limited 
circumstances the reasonable expectations of the insured 
may override the clear and unambiguous terms of the 
contract. 38 F.3d 1303, 1311 (3d Cir. 1994). In reaching 
this conclusion, the court observed: 
 
       We are unable to draw any categorical distinction 
       between the types of cases in which Pennsylvania 
       courts will allow the reasonable expectations of the 
       insured to defeat the unambiguous language of an 
       insurance policy and those in which the courts will 
       follow the general rule of adhering to the pr ecise terms 
       of the policy. One theme that emerges fr om all the 
       cases, however, is that courts are to be chary about 
       allowing insurance companies to abuse their position 
       vis-a-vis their customers. Thus, we are confident that 
       where the insurer or its agent cr eates in the insured a 
       reasonable expectation of coverage that is not supported 
       by the terms of the policy that expectation will prevail 
       over the language of the policy. 
 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 
As discussed in more detail below, the obligation of 
courts to invalidate insurance contract provisions that are 
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contrary to state law or policy has been taken very 
seriously by Pennsylvania courts. However, before we can 
determine if state law or policy is implicated we must 
examine the legislative intent and policies underlying 
Pennsylvania's MVFRL. 
 
C. Pennsylvania Public Policy and the MVFRL 
 
Generally, statutes requiring underinsur ed motorist 
coverage are remedial and must be construed liberally, 
narrowly interpreting exclusions so as to provide the desired 
remedy. Couch, supra SS 45:624. The purpose of these 
statutes is limited to protecting those persons who 
purchase motor vehicle liability insurance and then suffer 
bodily injury or property damage caused by a motorist who 
did not purchase similar coverage. Id. Pennsylvania 
embodied its public policy of protecting such persons in the 
MVFRL. Applicable standards of statutory construction 
compel Pennsylvania courts to "ascertain and ef fectuate the 
intention of the General Assembly" and to strive to give 
effect to all provisions in a statute. 1 Pa.C.S. S 1921(a). See 
also Kmonk-Sullivan, 746 A.2d at 1121. 
 
The MVFRL contains no explicit statement of legislative 
intent or purpose. However, Pennsylvania courts are 
unanimous that the legislative intent underlying the 
MVFRL was to establish a liberal compensatory scheme of 
underinsured motorist protection. See, e.g., Kmonk- 
Sullivan, 746 A.2d at 1123; Marroquin v. Mutual Benefit Ins. 
Co., 591 A.2d 290, 293 (Pa. Super. 1991). Courts also agree 
that the MVFRL is a remedial statute that must be liberally 
construed to effectuate its policy of indemnifying victims of 
accidents for harm they suffer on Pennsylvania highways. 
See, e.g., Kmonk-Sullivan, 746 A.2d at 1123; Allwein, 671 
A.2d at 751; Wolgemuth v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., 535 
A.2d 1145, 1151 (Pa. Super. 1988). 
 
More specifically, UIM insurance is designed to protect an 
insured from a negligent driver of another vehicle who 
causes injury to the insured, but through no fault of the 
insured, lacks adequate insurance coverage to compensate 
the insured for his or her injuries. Eichelman v. Nationwide 
Ins. Co., 711 A.2d 1006, 1008 (Pa. 1998); Kmonk-Sullivan, 
746 A.2d at 1123; Wolgemuth, 535 A.2d at 1149. 
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Pennsylvania courts have been especially attentive to the 
fact that UIM coverage is purchased "to pr otect oneself from 
other drivers whose liability insurance purchasing decisions 
are beyond one's control." Paylor , 640 A.2d at 1238. See 
also Kmonk-Sullivan, 746 A.2d at 1123. 
 
In cases such as this one Pennsylvania courts have also 
been attentive to whether or not there wer e two or more 
insurance contracts at play: 
 
       The language of the [MVFRL] itself suggests that 
       underinsurance motorist coverage requir es the 
       existence of at least two applicable policies of motor 
       vehicle insurance. See 75 Pa. C.S. S 1731(c). An 
       underinsured motor vehicle, must, by definition, be an 
       insured vehicle. Thus, the statute contemplates one 
       policy applicable to the vehicle which is at fault in 
       causing the injury to the claimant and which is the 
       source of liability coverage . . . , and a second policy 
       . . . which the statute contemplates as the sour ce of 
       underinsured motorist coverage. . . . 
 
Wolgemuth, 535 A.2d at 1149 (emphasis in original). It is 
noteworthy that this condition is met here. That is, there 
are two policies at play - the liability insurance policy of 
Nicolucci and the UIM insurance policy of the appellants. 
As discussed below, in virtually all instances wher e UIM 
insurance exclusions are upheld it is because this condition 
is NOT present and the insureds ar e attempting to convert 
inexpensive UIM coverage in their policy into the more 
expensive liability insurance under the same policy. 
 
In 1990 the legislature amended the MVFRL, which had 
previously made the purchase of UIM insurance mandatory, 
to give insureds the choice of saving money on premiums or 
purchasing more protective coverage, such as UIM 
coverage. See generally Kmonk-Sullivan, 746 A.2d at 1124. 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court finds these amendments 
relevant in that "there is a corr elation between premiums 
paid by the insured and the coverage the claimant should 
reasonably expect to receive." Eichelman, 711 A.2d at 1010 
(quoting Hall v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co., 648 A.2d 755, 761 (Pa. 
1994)). Thus, by choosing to purchase UIM insurance, in 
the event of an injury caused by an underinsur ed 
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tortfeasor, an insured reasonably expects to shift the risk of 
loss to his or her insurer. Kmonk-Sullivan, 746 A.2d at 
1124. Any other approach would shift the costs to the 
insureds who had no part in creating the risk that led to 
their injuries and who had no control over the tortfeasor's 
insurance decisions. "Allowing the insurers to evade 
payment of UIM benefits in [such a] case, where the 
insured had paid a premium to procur e UIM coverage, 
would be against public policy." Kmonk-Sullivan, 746 A.2d 
at 1124 & 1126. 
 
D. Application of the MVFRL's Policies to UIM Insurance 
Contracts 
 
As noted briefly above, Pennsylvania courts take their 
obligation to review and invalidate insurance contract 
provisions that are contrary to state law very seriously. 
There are innumerable cases addressing this issue and 
while state courts do not invalidate clear and unambiguous 
insurance clauses in every instance, neither have they been 
reticent about doing so, especially in cases involving 
attempts by insurers to withhold paid-for UIM benefits. 
There are two cases of particular r elevance to the instant 
case. 
 
In Trapper v. Maryland Cas. Ins. Co., the Pennsylvania 
Court of Common Pleas invalidated a clear contractual 
provision that excluded an insured fr om recovering UIM 
benefits after he had already recover ed liability benefits 
under the same insurance contract. 17 Pa. D. & C. 4th 165 
(1992). Trapper is factually indistinguishable from the 
instant case in that it involved a clear and unambiguous 
policy exclusion and that it was a two vehicle accident 
involving two tortfeasors. The court noted, "the operation of 
this clause excludes a class of plaintiffs in joint tortfeasor, 
two-car accidents who have paid for coverage and who have 
no control over the choice or type of coverage for a second 
non-occupied, non-owned vehicle." Id. at 168. The court 
concluded that the exclusion of UIM benefits in such a 
situation extinguishes UIM coverage for accident victims, 
regardless of the severity of their injuries, when a family 
member is the driver of one of the vehicles. Id.  at 169. "The 
elimination of UIM motorist benefits in this situation 
results in the insured paying for benefits that cannot be 
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recovered. Clearly this cannot be the intent of the MVFRL." 
Id. The Trapper court's analysis is even more applicable to 
our case, where the appellants paid for very substantial 
liability coverage and substantial UIM coverage with the 
expectation that, as a result, they would be fully covered for 
any injuries sustained in a car accident regar dless of the 
amount of liability coverage purchased by the other driver. 
 
The second case of particular relevance is Continental Ins. 
Co. v. Kubek decided by a federal District Court applying 
Pennsylvania law. 86 F.Supp.2d 503 (E.D. Pa. 2000). The 
issue in Kubek was whether an insurer was required to 
provide UIM coverage to an insured who had already 
recovered liability benefits from his insurer and from the 
other driver's insurer. Id. The insurer moved for summary 
judgment based on a "family vehicle exclusion," which 
operated to preclude dual recovery in the same way that 
the dual recovery prohibition in the Cosenzas' contract 
purportedly precludes recovery. Id.  Thus, while the policy 
exclusion in Kubek is not identical to the exclusion at issue 
in our case, it has the exact same effect in the exact same 
factual circumstances. 
 
After an extensive review of state case law, the Kubek 
court refused to uphold the family car exclusion, 
concluding that cases involving only one tortfeasor were not 
applicable to determining the enforceability of coverage 
exclusions in joint tortfeasor cases. Id. at 505-07. After 
reviewing the reasoning behind upholding exclusions in 
single tortfeasor cases and the intent behind the MVFRL, 
the District Court concluded that even though the victim 
received liability benefits under his wife's (one of the 
drivers) policy, that recovery was based only on her role in 
the accident and had no effect on the victim's ability to 
claim UIM benefits under the same policy for the other 
tortfeasor's negligence. Id. at 509. This conclusion was 
based on the rationale that "[a]s ther e are two policies in 
play, the prohibition on recovering fr om a single policy is 
not at issue; Mr. Kubek is not attempting to convert his 
UIM coverage into liability coverage." Id.  
 
Finally, it is noteworthy that Pennsylvania courts have 
invalidated express UIM provisions excluding coverage as 
violative of public policy or the intent of the MVFRL in other 
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instances as well. For example, courts have r epeatedly 
refused to enforce clear and unambiguous definitions of 
underinsured vehicles that exclude vehicles owned by 
government agencies. See, e.g., Midili v. Erie Insurance 
Group, 746 A.2d 1126 (Pa. Super. 2000); Kmonk-Sullivan v. 
State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 746 A.2d 1118 (Pa. Super. 1999). 
Courts have also refused to enforce contract provisions that 
provide for gap UIM coverage, which provides less coverage 
than excess UIM coverage, because such provisions are 
contrary to the intent of the MVFRL. See, e.g., Allwein v. 
Donegal Mut. Ins. Co., 671 A.2d 744 (Pa. Super . 1996). 
 
E. Application of the MVFRL to Dual Recovery Exclusion 
 
Before moving to a specific discussion of how the relevant 
case law and the MVFRL applies to the facts of this case 
and this insurance contract, it is helpful to first address 
Nationwide's two arguments in favor of enfor cing the 
exclusion on dual recovery. First, Nationwide argues 
extensively that, regardless of the existence of a provision 
in the contract prohibiting recovery of both liability and 
UIM benefits, Pennsylvania public policy never  allows dual 
recovery. Obviously, the Trapper and Kubek cases 
referenced above directly contradict this assertion. Further, 
however, even in cases upholding exclusions that preclude 
recovery of UIM benefits, including the cases Nationwide 
cites in support of its argument, the courts have noted that 
dual recovery is not prohibited in all cases. See, e.g., 
Pempkowski v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co. , 678 A.2d 
398, 403 (Pa. Super. 1996)(finding dual r ecovery prohibited 
because case involved only a single tortfeasor , but noting 
that such recovery would be allowed in cases involving joint 
tortfeasors and two insurance policies). Instead, whether a 
victim can recover both liability benefits and UIM benefits 
under the same insurance policy depends on the particular 
facts of the case at bar. 
 
There is a certain category of cases wher e courts have 
uniformly declined to invalidate insurance exclusions that 
preclude recovery of both UIM benefits and liability 
benefits. It is these case and only these cases that 
Nationwide cites in support of its argument that dual 
recovery is always prohibited. These cases are easily 
distinguishable from the appellants' case, however, because 
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all of these cases involve single tortfeasor accidents and 
usually only one insurance policy. See W olgemuth, 535 
A.2d 1145 (Pa. Super. 1988 (en banc) (single vehicle 
accident, exclusion enforceable to prevent conversion of 
UIM benefits to liability benefits); Newkirk v. USAA, 597 
A.2d 1153 (Pa. Super. 1990)(same); Sturkie v. Erie, 595 
A.2d 152 (Pa. Super. 1991)(same); Caldararo v. Keystone 
Ins. Co., 573 A.2d 1108 (Pa. Super. 1990)(single vehicle 
accident, family car exclusion enforceable to prevent 
conversion of benefits); Cooperstein v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. 
Co., 611 A.2d 721 (Pa. Super. 1992)(multiple vehicle 
accident, but exclusion upheld to avoid conversion of UIM 
benefits to liability benefits because ther e was only one 
tortfeasor). We are in accord with the Kubek court's 
extensive analysis, which concluded that these single 
tortfeasor cases were inapplicable to multiple tortfeasor, 
multiple insurance contract cases such as this one. 
Moreover, the rationale behind pr ohibiting dual recovery in 
single tortfeasor cases is simply inapplicable to joint 
tortfeasor cases. 
 
Liability insurance is the most expensive for m of 
insurance in Pennsylvania. UIM insurance, on the other 
hand, is relatively inexpensive. As a r esult, Pennsylvania 
courts have refused to invalidate insurance contract 
exclusions that bar an insured from converting inexpensive 
UIM insurance into the more expensive liability insurance. 
Such a conversion can be accomplished when an insur ed 
purchases a small amount of liability insurance and then, 
once the insured is injured in an accident for which he or 
she was at fault, attempt to claim UIM benefits under the 
same insurance contract on the theory that the vehicle was 
underinsured. The Kubek court's apt summary of 
Pennsylvania law is instructive: 
 
       The true holdings of Wolgemuth and its progeny are 
       that an individual should not be able to convert the 
       relatively inexpensive underinsured motorist insurance 
       into the more expensive liability insurance simply by 
       undercovering him or herself for liability insurance and 
       then claiming that the vehicle was `underinsur ed.' 
 
86 F.Supp.2d at 508. The rationale behind UIM insurance 
is inapplicable in single tortfeasor cases, wher e injured 
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parties can ensure that they have adequate coverage simply 
by purchasing adequate liability insurance. These are not 
cases where the victim is injured by someone whose 
liability insurance choices are beyond the victim's control. 
Finally, in accord with its thorough analysis of 
Pennsylvania state law, the Kubek court concluded that 
enforcing the family car exception is a "limited exception to 
the general rule that such provisions ar e invalid as against 
the policy of the MVFRL." Id. at 508. See also Paylor, 640 
A.2d at 1240; Marroquin, 591 A.2d 296-97. Thus, it is the 
exception, rather than the rule, to enforce such 
exclusionary provisions. 
 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has clearly stated that 
the primary consideration in determining the enforceability 
of an exclusion in an UIM contract is whether or not 
allowing recovering would effect a conversion of UIM 
coverage to liability coverage. In Paylor v. Hartford Ins. Co., 
the Court concluded that a family car exclusion was 
enforceable. In reaching this conclusion, however, the Court 
explained that the key issue in determining the 
enforceability of this type of UIM exclusion is whether, 
based on the facts of the particular case, the insur ed is 
attempting to convert UIM coverage into liability coverage. 
640 A.2d 1234, 1240-41 (Pa. 1994). 
 
Because a case by case analysis is requir ed we must 
determine whether invalidating the dual r ecovery 
prohibition in this case would allow appellants to effect an 
unlawful conversion of UIM benefits to liability benefits. 
This inquiry also allows us to address Nationwide's second 
argument in favor of enforcing the coverage exclusion. 
Allowing appellants to recover UIM benefits in the instant 
case would not effect a conversion of UIM benefits to 
liability benefits. In this case, when the umbr ella insurance 
policy is taken into account, appellants pur chased very 
substantial liability insurance (in excess of $1,500,000). 
However, if the dual recovery pr ohibition is enforced, it is 
irrelevant how much liability insurance they purchased. 
They still would not be able to recover for the full value of 
their injuries because they were injured by a driver who 
purchased inadequate liability insurance. This is not a case 
where appellants would be fully compensated for their 
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injuries if only they had purchased mor e liability insurance. 
In fact, it is the opposite case. They purchased very large 
liability insurance coverage AND very large UIM coverage 
($1,000,000) with the expectation that they would be 
compensated for their injuries regardless of who was at 
fault and how much insurance that person had opted to 
purchase. To prohibit recovery denies them the UIM 
benefits that they paid for for many years and is contrary 
to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's statement that 
insureds should receive the coverage for which they pay 
and that voluntarily choosing to purchase UIM insurance 
shifts the risk of loss to the insurer. See Eichelman, 711 
A.2d at 1010; Hall, 648 A.2d at 761; Kmonk-Sullivan, 746 
A.2d at 1124. Further, appellants' voluntary decision to 
purchase such substantial liability and UIM insurance 
policies reasonably created an expectation that they would 
be covered. As we held in Bensalem Twp., when a 
reasonable expectation of coverage is not supported by the 
terms of the policy, the expectation of coverage prevails 
over the language of the policy. 38 F.3d at 1311. 
 
Nationwide argues that allowing recovery would effect a 
conversion of UIM benefits into liability benefits because of 
the laws of joint and several liability. It ar gues that 
appellants will attempt to recover UIM damages for all of 
their injuries, including those injuries attributable to the 
negligence of Mrs. Cosenza, who was a named insur ed. The 
argument is that under principles of joint and several 
liability Nationwide will be required to pay for all of the 
damages, but will be unable to recover those damages that 
are due to the comparative negligence of the driver for 
whom they have already paid liability benefits. This 
argument is unavailing for several reasons. First, it has not 
been established in this case that Mrs. Cosenza, the driver 
insured under Nationwide's liability policy, has any fault for 
the accident. Second, no Pennsylvania court has expr essed 
the slightest bit of concern over the fatalistic scenario that 
the application of joint and several liability will lead to a 
conversion of coverage, despite the fact that at least two 
courts have allowed dual recovery. Finally, Nationwide 
provides no evidence whatsoever that the application of 
such principles is mandatory in arbitration of these cases 
or that appellants would demand damages for all of their 
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injuries, as opposed to seeking recovery only for those 
injuries attributable to the comparative negligence of the 
underinsured motorist. The latter is appellants' 
acknowledged position in this appeal. Further , it is our 
expectation that, consistent with Pennsylvania law and this 
opinion, an arbitrator would allow recovery of damages 
attributable to the underinsured motorist's negligence, but 
would reject a demand for recovery of damages attributable 
to any contributory negligence by Mrs. Cosenza as contrary 
to the MVFRL. 
 
Application of the principles underlying the MVFRL also 
supports invalidating the dual recovery pr ohibition in 
multiple tortfeasor cases. First, as discussed above, 
enforcing the dual recovery prohibition would result in 
denying appellants benefits for which they voluntarily paid 
additional premiums. Such a denial is contrary to the 
intent of the amendments to the MVFRL, which gave 
consumers the option of purchasing UIM benefits, but that 
also assumes consumers are entitled to the benefits that 
they voluntarily opted to purchase. Further , it denies them 
paid-for benefits in a case where they wer e injured by 
someone whose liability insurance purchasing decisions 
they could not control, the very situation they sought to 
avoid by purchasing UIM benefits and the very purpose for 
which UIM insurance exists. See Paylor, 640 A.2d at 1238; 
Eichelman, 711 A.2d at 1008; Kmonk-Sullivan , 746 A.2d at 
1123. 
 
Second, the only directly applicable case law, that which 
involves two or more tortfeasors and two or mor e insurance 
policies, invalidated insurance exclusions that operated to 
deny UIM benefits. Trapper, 17 Pa. D. & C. 4th 165; Kubek, 
86 F.Supp.2d 503. These two decisions find additional 
support in the cases discussed above that uphold UIM 
exclusions, but that nonetheless recognize that cases 
involving two tortfeasors and two insurance policies are 
analytically distinct. See Wolgemuth, 535 A.2d at 1135; 
Pempkowski, 678 A.2d at 403. As the Pempkowski court 
noted, in joint tortfeasor situations, a claimant is not 
always precluded from seeking liability and UIM insurance 
benefits under the same policy. 678 A.2d at 403. See also 
Kubek, 86 F.Supp.2d at 505-09. The Pennsylvania Supreme 
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Court's decision in Paylor also supports r ecovery for the 
appellants because, under the facts of this case, allowing 
recovery would not allow the insureds to convert 
inexpensive UIM coverage into more costly liability 
coverage. 640 A.2d at 1240-41. 
 
Third, upholding the dual recovery pr ohibition in 
multiple tortfeasor cases would be counter to the express 
purpose of UIM insurance, which is "protecting those 
persons who purchase motor vehicle liability insurance and 
then suffer bodily injury or property damage caused by a 
motorist who did not purchase similar coverage." Couch, 
supra S 45:624; Kmonk-Sullivan, 746 A.2d at 1123. Clearly, 
if the underinsured driver, Nicolucci, had purchased the 
same amount of liability coverage that appellants 
purchased, they could have recover ed for the full extent of 
their injuries. A fourth, and related, r eason to find the dual 
recovery provision unenforceable in this case, is that the 
MVFRL is a remedial statute that must be br oadly 
construed to effectuate its goal of fully compensating 
victims injured on Pennsylvania highways. Accor dingly, 
Pennsylvania courts narrowly construe exclusions such as 
the one at issue here. Kmonk-Sullivan, 746 A.2d at 1123; 
Allwein, 671 A.2d at 751. See also Couch, supra S 45:624. 
In this case, the only construction of the dual r ecovery 
prohibition consistent with Pennsylvania case law and the 
MVFRL, is to limit its enforceability to situations involving 
single tortfeasors, where invalidating the exclusion would 
permit the conversion of UIM benefits to liability benefits. 
 
Fifth, and finally, state law requires that, in close cases, 
courts opt for an interpretation of the MVFRL and 
contractual provisions that provides coverage for the 
insured. English, 664 A.2d at 87; Kmonk-Sullivan, 764 A.2d 
at 1123; Allwein, 671 A.2d at 751. This appr oach is in 
accord with the presumption that the state legislature 
intends to favor the public interest over the private interest. 
English, 664 A.2d at 87. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that enforcement 
of the dual recovery prohibition in multiple tortfeasor cases 
such as this one is violative of the MVFRL. However , as the 
preceding discussion indicates, in single tortfeasor cases 
the dual recovery exclusion actually pr omotes the goals of 
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the MVFRL by barring unlawful conversion of UIM coverage 
to liability coverage. We cannot, ther efore, categorically 
declare that the exclusion is invalid and unenforceable. 
Instead, following the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's 
mandate to narrowly construe exclusions in insurance 
contracts, we construe the dual recovery pr ohibition as 
speaking only to single tortfeasor accidents wher e allowing 
recovery would effectuate a conversion of UIM coverage. 
This construction reads the exclusion as incorporating the 
case law pronouncements on the dual recovery issue into 
the insurance contract and invalidates the exclusion only in 
joint tortfeasor cases where enforcing it would be contrary 
to applicable case law and the intent of the MVFRL. 
Accordingly, we cannot agree with the District Court's 
holding that the dual recovery provision prohibits Mr. 
Cosenza and Ms. Dezii from seeking UIM benefits under the 
auto insurance policy or the umbrella policy for any 
damages due by law as a result of Nicolucci's negligence. 
We also hold that Mrs. Cosenza may seek loss of 
consortium benefits based on her husband's injuries under 
both the UIM coverage of the auto insurance policy and the 
umbrella policy. 
 
IV 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the District Court's Order of 
October 27, 1999 declining to dismiss the case for lack of 
jurisdiction is affirmed. The District Court's Order of 
November 3, 2000, prohibiting appellants fr om seeking 
recovery of underinsured motorist benefits, is reversed, and 
the matter is remanded back to the District Court for the 
entry of an Order referring the matter to arbitration for the 
purpose of determining the amount of an awar d under the 
underinsured motorist provisions of the auto insurance 
policy and the umbrella policy. Costs taxed against the 
appellee. 
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